On the 31st of January 2025, the Bridging Disciplines interdisciplinary reading group commenced with philosopher Jonathan Birch’s new book The Edge of Sentience as part of LIFT’s interdisciplinary group Bridging Disciplines. This reading group is truly interdisciplinary, with participants of diverse backgrounds ranging from philosophy of emotions, moral and linguistics, applied philosophy, conceptual history and animal ethics, to ethology, animal welfare science and behaviour, evolutionary ecology, veterinary medicine, psychology, and politics.
This first discussion was centred around chapters 1 and 2 where Birch begins to lay the foundations of his book, introducing his definition of sentience: “the capacity to have valenced experiences”, implying that the being in question does not merely have ‘phenomenal consciousness’ but experiences its environment in a way that feels good or bad to the being. This definition was met with some support as well as some contention. On the one hand, focusing on valence seems to circumvent the anthropocentrism of emotions as it strips back emotions to its essential building blocks, allowing its application to be much more widespread to other living beings. On the other hand, this approach still appears somewhat anthropocentric given that valence is a fundamental characteristic of human sentience, allowing us to relate and remain in familiar territory. This approach of focusing on valence excludes the potential for non-valenced, phenomenal consciousness that may also be of ethical relevance. However, considering non-valenced, phenomenal consciousness presents its own set of challenges, as it is not yet clear what moral theory this could be grounded in, and how this would be dealt with practically and scientifically, for example to distinguish from automatic reflexes. Adding to the complexity are the difficulties of implementing political change, a main goal of the book, and the reliance on hard scientific evidence to effect this change.
Therefore, the focus on valence is seen as practically advantageous as it grants moral consideration for many species. However, it was acknowledged that this may mean certain species will inevitably be excluded from moral consideration due to lack of scientific evidence even if they do possess this characteristic, or because they function in an entirely different way. Rather than seeing this as an either or situation, both can be true at the same time where sentience continues to be an important characteristic for ethical consideration, but that we should also be open to other possibilities. A recommendation for the way forward is to continue engaging in interdisciplinary discussions, challenging our own epistemic views and incorporating the epistemic views of others, continuously expanding and updating our knowledge. This iterative process in collaboration with other disciplines will help to inform animal welfare science in the face of uncertainty.
Already these first two chapters have ignited discussions on a wide array of topics from theory to practice, highlighting the conundrums often faced when balancing different points of views and practical realities, but also the opportunities that can arise from engaging in such dialogues. We are very much looking forward to how this book will unfold and the type of discussions that will follow.
If you would still like to join this reading group, please email Konstantin.Deininger@vetmeduni.ac.at to be added to the Google group. The group meets every last Friday of the month from 10:00 to 11:30 AM CET.
Written by: Suzanne Truong
Reviewed by: Konstantin Deininger and Lisa Dickel
Date written: 03.02.2025
